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ABSTRACT 
The Ordered Probit model analysis procedure was applied to determine the factors 
(related to fixed and variable transaction costs) influencing the decision to participate in 
cassava markets by a sample of 360 smallholder farmers in South-Eastern Nigeria. 
Participation decisions revealed that membership of cooperatives or social organizations, 
farming experience and marketing experience had a positive relationship with decision to 
be autarkic other than buyer and seller other than autarkic and significant at 1.0% level of 
probability. The coefficients for frequency of extension contacts, age, native of community, 
road conditions to the nearest town and yield were also positive and significantly related 
to decision to be autarkic other than buyer and seller other than autarkic at 5% level of 
probability. The coefficient for access to communication facilities was positive and 
significantly related to decision to remain autarkic other than buyer and seller other than 
autarkic. The coefficients for education, distance to the nearest town, distance from the 
farm to the market and crop transportation were negative and significantly related with 
the decision to remain autarkic other than a seller and buyer other than autarkic at 1% 
level of probability. The coefficient for gender was positive and significantly related to 
decision by female farmers to be autarkic other than buyer and seller other than autarkic. 
These decisions to participate as a buyer, seller or remain autarkic were as a result of 
fixed and proportional transaction costs associated with participating in the market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fresh cassava roots, with about 70% water content, are bulky and therefore expensive to 
transport especially over long distances. The roots are also perishable, and begin to 
deteriorate soon after harvest. These features are expected to have profound bearing on the 
trade network for the roots. For instance, the bulky nature of the roots makes the market 
for fresh roots more localized around the producing areas than the market for processed 
cassava products. Also the perishability factor makes the marketing process considerably 
shorter for fresh roots than other cassava products (Ezedinma et al., 2007). 
 
Cassava (Manihot esculenta Crantz) is an important staple food and cash crop in several 
tropical African countries especially Nigeria where it plays a principal role in the food 
economy (Agwu and Anyaeche, 2007). Nigeria is the world’s largest producer of cassava, 
with about 47,274,320mt and yield of 13.027tonne/ha. The South-East zone is leading in 
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cassava production accounting for over 37% of the National production (NAERLS and 
NFRA, 2009). 
 
In developing countries, smallholder farmers find it difficult to participate in markets 
because of a range of constraints and barriers reducing the incentives for participation, 
which may be reflected in hidden costs that make access to markets and productive assets 
difficult (Makhura et al., 2001). Transaction costs, that is, observable (variable) and non-
observable (fixed) costs associated with exchange, are the embodiment of access barriers 
to market participation by resource poor smallholders (Holloway et al, 2000)  
 
Households commonly incur fixed costs in making the decision to trade in a market. Such 
costs are known to exist irrespective of transactions volume and surely affect the decision 
about how much quantity to supply to the market noted by (Cogan, 1981) in a neo-
classical model of labour supply. Yet the standard estimation of market supply equations 
fails to account for these fixed costs (Holloway et al., 2005). Hobbs (1997) classified fixed 
transaction costs into information, negotiation, and monitoring or enforcement costs. Fixed 
and variable transaction costs impact on market participation whereas supply decisions 
(amount sold), conditional on market participation, only depend on variable transaction 
costs.  
 
If transaction costs are large, they need to be measured and explained. de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, (2005) have argued that attempting to observe them directly will always 
underestimate their importance, quite likely by large amounts. The study showed, 
however, that they can be derived from observed behaviour. Transaction costs reflect the 
character of the market, but are mainly embedded in household characteristics and their 
economic environment (Holloway et al., 2000 and Makhura, et al., 2001). ).  The objective 
of the paper is to identify factors that influence the decision of smallholder farmers to 
participate in cassava markets. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
(a) The Theoretical Model: The Ordered Probit model is a widely used approach to 
estimating models of ordered type which almost employs the probit link function. There is 
a latent continuous metric underlying the ordinal responses observed by the analyst. The 
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latent continuous variable, Y* is a linear combination of some predictors, X, plus a 
disturbance term that has a standard Normal distribution:  
Yi* = Xiβ + ε             (1) 
The latent variable Yi* exhibits itself in ordinal categories, which could be coded as 0, 1, 
2,…, k. The response of category k is thus observed when the underlying continuous 
response falls in the k-th interval as: 
Y* = 0 if  Y* ≤ δ0  
Y* = 1 if  δ0 < Y* ≤ δ1  
Y* = 2 if δ1
 
< Y* ≤ δ2         (2) 
Where Y* (i=0, 1, 2) are the unobservable threshold parameters that will be estimated 
together with other parameters in the model. When an intercept coefficient is included in 
the model, Y0* is normalized to a zero value (Green, 2000) and hence only k-1 additional 
parameters are estimated with Xs. Like the models for binary data, the probabilities for 
each of the observed ordinal response which in this study had 3 responses (0, 1, 2,) will be 
given as: 
prob (Y = 0) = P(Y* ≤ 0) = P (β'X + εi ≤ 0) = ø (-β'X) 
prob (Y = 1) = ø (δ1 - β'X) - ø (-β'X) 
prob (Y = 2) = 1- ø (δ1 - β'X)        (3) 
where 0 < Y1* < Y2*  <...<Y*k-1 …. n is the cumulative normal  distribution function such 
that the sum total of the above probabilities is equal to one.  The specification of the 
ordered probit model is as follows. Let Y i denote the category – net buyer (0 = Y i), 
autarkic (1 = Y i), or net seller (2 = Y i) – to which household i belongs.  
(b) The Empirical Model: In this study, the market participation decision for cassava 
farmers is specified as follows; 
Iisell or not = b0 + b1opX1op + b2opX2op + b3opXop + b4opX4op + b5opX5op + b6opX6op +    
b7opX7op + b8opX8op + b9opX9op + b10opX10op + b11opX11op + b12opX12op + b13opX13op + b14opX14op 
+ b15opX15op+ b16opX16op + b17opX17op+ b18opX18op + b19opX19op+ b20opX20op + b21prX21pr + 
b22opX22op + b23opX23op    + b24opX24op  + uiop                                    (4) 
Where;  
Iisell or not=Buyer = 0, Autarky = 1 and Seller = 2 
 
X1 is number of extension visits/year, X2 is membership of cooperatives (dummy variable; 
I=member, 0=non member), X3 is access to communication facilities (dummy variable; 
1=yes, 0=no), X4 is level of education (in years), X5 is gender (dummy variable; 1=male, 
0=female), X6 is age of household head (in years), X7 is native of community (dummy 
 4 
variable; 1= native, 0 = otherwise), X8 is farming experience (in years), X9 is time to get 
paid (days), X10 is number of times asked for payment, X11 is personal means of 
transportation (dummy variable; 1=yes, 0=no), X12 is distance to nearest town (km), X13 is 
distance from the farm to the market (km), X14 is distance from the house to the market 
(km), X15 is distance from the house to the farm (km), X16 is amount of credit borrowed in 
Naira, X17 is crop transportation costs (Naira/tonne), X18 is household size, X19 is 
dependency ratio (the number of dependents below 18 and above 60 per household of 
working age), X20 is road conditions to nearest town (dummy variable; 1=good, 0=bad), 
X21 is marketing experience (in years), X22 is farm income in naira, X23 is non farm income 
in Naira, X24 is Cassava yield (kg/ha), b1 – b24  are coefficients to be estimated and uiop is 
error term. 
(c) The Data: The South East Agro Ecological Zone of Nigeria was our main focus. The 
Zone lies between latitude 6° and 9°E and 4° and 7°N longitude, has a total land mass 
of 10,952,400ha. The zone has over 16 million resident populations (NPC, 2006). The 
zone is made up of five states viz: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States. About 
60-70% of the inhabitants engaged in agriculture, mainly crop farming and animal rearing. 
Three out of the 5 states in the South-East agricultural zone were randomly selected for the 
study. They were Anambra, Abia and Enugu States. A multi-stage randomised sampling 
procedure was used to collect cross sectional data to identify factors of market 
participation among cassava producing households. At the second stage two agricultural 
zones per state were randomly selected. They were; Enugu North and Enugu East for 
Enugu State, Anambra and Onitsha for Anambra State and Umuahia and Ohafia for Abia 
State given a total of six agricultural zones. In the third stage, two LGAs were randomly 
selected from each zone given a sample of 12 LGAs. In the fourth stage, three communities 
were selected randomly from each Local Government Area given a sample of 36 
communities. In the last stage 10 household producers were randomly selected, given a 
total of 360. Data were collected by means of structured questionnaire to collect a range of 
information, which entails information about households regarding gender and age of the 
household head, size of the household, farm income and assets such as non-farm income, as well 
as transport equipment. Access to market information was collected in terms of average household 
education, contact with extension service and proximity to the nearest town where the markets are 
etc. The conditions of the roads to the markets were also determined, etc.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Decision on Market Participation 
The ordered probit model of discrete market participation is shown in table 1. The non-
zero censoring points were of negative signs, with the lower censoring threshold at -1.63 
cassava net purchases and the upper threshold at -0.94 cassava net sales, each statistically 
significantly different from zero. These estimates suggest that purchases or sales of less 
than 1kg are generally uneconomical. People were more willing to enter the market for 
smaller volume sales than purchases, likely reflecting the fact that sales of cassava are 
essentially means by which households meet immediate cash needs related to payment of 
school fees, food purchases and ceremonial or emergency health expenses (Bellemare and 
Barret, 2006). The goodness-of-fit measured by the chi2 showed that the choice of 
explanatory variables included in the ordered probit model explained the variation in 
decisions to participate in the market.  
 
All variables related to information and search costs were positive and significantly related 
to the categorical outcome except education which was negative. The coefficients for 
membership of cooperative societies and level of education were significant at 1.0% level 
of probability while access to communication facilities and frequency of extension contact 
were significant at 10.0% and 5.0% level of probability respectively.  Farmers who have 
access to communication facilities, membership of cooperative societies with more 
frequency of extension contacts were more likely to be autarkic than buyers and were 
more likely to be sellers than to be autarkic, ceteris paribus. Farmers who were more 
educated were more likely to be autarkic than sellers and were more likely to be buyers 
than autarkic. Contact with extension officers tends to improve farmers' access to 
information (Lapar et al., 2003). Access to information through extension, membership of 
cooperative societies, access to communication facilities and education tends to remove 
the fixed transaction costs facing the smallholder farmers in entering the cassava markets. 
The negative coefficient of education was contrary to the usual expectation. This suggests 
the strong competing effect of diverting skills to other off-farm employment opportunities 
as the level of education increases within the household in this particular data set.  
 
Variables related to bargaining and negotiation costs that were significant were gender, 
age, native of community and farming experience.  
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Table 4.4: Results of Ordered Probit regression for Market Participation 
Variable Parameter Coefficient Std. 
error  
t-value 
Frequency of Extension Contact  b1 0.0444 0.0181 2.4530** 
Membership of Cooperatives b2 0.4098 0.1277 3.2091*** 
Access to Communication facilities b3 0.2641 0.1430 1.8468* 
Level of Education(years)  b4 -0.0116 0.0031 -3.7154*** 
Gender b5 -0.2518 0.0921 -2.7341** 
Age (years) b6 0.0143 0.0049 2.9184** 
Native of Community b7 0.0571 0.0211 2.7075** 
Farming Experience (years) b8 0.0127 0.0021 5.9112*** 
Time to get paid in days b9 0.0150 0.0246 0.6097 
Number of times asked for payment b10 -0.1242 0.2633 -0.4717 
Have personal means of transport b11  0.1023 0.1963  0.5211 
Distance to the nearest town (km) b12 -0.0326  0.0103 -3.1650*** 
Distance from the farm to the market 
(km) 
b13 -0.1852 0.0356 -6.0602*** 
Distance from the house to the market 
(km) 
b14 -0.0139 0.0300 -0.4618 
Distance from the house to the farm 
(km) 
b15  0.0063   0.0283  0.2225 
Volume of Credit (N) b16 -0.0070    0.0132 -0.5311 
Cost of transportation (N/kg) b17 -0.0994   . 0.0218 -4.5596*** 
Household Size b18 -0.0099   0.0394 -0.2512 
Dependency ratio b19 -0.0249     0.0561 -0.4438 
Road conditions to the nearest town b20 0.3290    0.1309 2.5116** 
Marketing Experience (years) b21 0.0039 0.0006 6.5394*** 
Farm income (N) b22  7.51e-07    6.55e-
07 
 1.1465 
Non farm Income (N) b23 -5.46e-07    9.13e07 -0.5980 
Yield (kg/ha) b24 0.0013   0.0005 2.6069** 
Ancillary Parameters     
c1  -1.633072    0.1433 -
11.4020*** 
c2  -0.9436378   0.1138 8.2910*** 
Log likelihood   -327.29233   
chi2           0.0000   
Survey Results 2010. *, ** and *** = Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
The coefficients for age and native of community were positive and significant at 5.0% 
level of probability, while gender was negative but significant at 5.0%. The coefficient for 
farming experience was positive and significant at 1.0% level of probability. Female-
headed households who are natives were more likely to be autarkic than buyers and were 
more likely to be sellers than autarkic, ceteris paribus. Female-headed households have a 
greater likelihood of participation in cassava markets than male-headed households. This 
follows the study of Arega et al., (2007) on maize markets in Kenya and Makhura, (2001) 
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on livestock markets in South Africa. Possibly because better sales bargain are made by 
women. The gender of the head of the household reflects the fact that female farmers will 
face lower transaction costs since they tend to have more credibility. 
 
Respondents who were older were more likely to be autarkic than to be buyers and were 
more likely to be sellers than to be autarkic, ceteris paribus. This could be suggesting that 
fixed costs such as language barriers or discrimination may constrain the ability of non-
indigenous or migrant farmers to integrate in some markets (Vakis et al., 2003). 
Experience (reflecting the ability to negotiate), increases farmers participation. The age of 
head of the household normally provides a proxy for experience in farming, Further, these 
farmers will have stronger social network and will have established credibility within the 
network (Makhura et al., 2001).  
 
Among the variables for proportional transportation costs, the coefficients for distance to 
nearest town and distance from the farm to the market and crop transportation costs were 
negative and significant at 1.0%level of probability. The road conditions to the nearest 
town and yield were also positive but significant at 5.0% level of probability. Farmers 
with long distance to the nearest town and from the farm to the market as well as high cost 
of crop transportation costs were likely to be autarkic other than sellers and buyers other 
than autarkic. If road conditions to the nearest town were good and yield of cassava high, 
farmers were likely to remain autarkic other than buyers and sellers other than autarkic. 
Poor infrastructure also leads to a hike in crop transportation costs per km. The variable 
transactions cost will be reduced if the markets would be located closer to the farmers with 
good road networks.  
 
The coefficients of the variables associated with monitoring and enforcement costs viz; 
time to get paid in days were positive and number of times asked for payment negative but 
not significant. The coefficients of volume of credit, distance from the house to the farm, 
house hold size dependency ratio and non-farm income were negative but not significant. 
The coefficients for farm income distance from the house to the market and have a 
personal means of transportation were positive but not significant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The results support previous studies that existence of transaction costs constrains 
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households from selling. Collectively, these results demonstrate the importance of 
allowing for non-negligible fixed costs in market participation studies. Policies that reduce 
transaction costs through improved transportation and the promotion of organizations for 
marketing would increase market participation by participants. In addition, improving 
rural infrastructure (e.g., access roads) would facilitate faster delivery of farm produce 
(especially perishable commodities such as cassava) to urban consumers. Also, provision 
of rural employment opportunities is essential to reduce migration to urban centers. The 
transaction costs of   participation could thus be reduced through improved information, 
transportation infrastructure and promotion of institutional innovations, such as production 
and marketing cooperatives.  
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